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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The human brain has the ability to develop specialized mechanisms dedicated 
to the efficient processing of a particular class of stimuli. The development of 
expertise with human faces is perhaps the best example of such specialization 
(Gauthier & Nelson, 2001). Although most adults have acquired a nearly unparalleled 
expertise for perceiving and processing faces, this skill is not universal. Many 
individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have not developed perceptual 
expertise with faces (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002).  
In recent years, a closer examination of the processes involved in acquiring 
perceptual expertise has generated a potential framework for understanding the lack 
of face expertise in autism (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). According to this line of research, the 
neural and behavioural correlates of face expertise can also be observed during the 
processing of non-face objects of expertise in typically developing adults (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Rossion et al., 2000). For example, individuals 
who have developed perceptual expertise with non-face objects are able to identify 
these objects on a subordinate level of categorization quickly and accurately (Tanaka 
& Taylor, 1991) and may even engage neural networks previously associated with 
face processing expertise in the processing of these objects (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Rossion et al., 2000). In line with these observations, there is also significant evidence 
that experts with non-face objects show perceptual specialization for the upright 
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forms of these objects (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Gauthier et al., 1998; Moore et al., 2006).  
Interestingly, both neural and behavioral markers of expertise have been found 
to be absent when individuals with ASD perceive faces (Gauthier, Klaiman, & 
Schultz, 2009; Hubl et al., 2003; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Langdell, 1978; 
McPartland, Dawson, Webb, Panagiotides, & Carver, 2004; Teunisse & de Gelder, 
2003). Rather, they seem to be ‘face novices’ (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002). 
Previous research indicates that this impairment may emerge in early infancy 
(Osterling & Dawson, 1994) and persist through adulthood (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell, & Cipolotti, 
2002; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006). In addition to an impairment in face 
processing ability, individuals with ASD tend to employ qualitatively different 
perceptual strategies in the processing of faces (Hobson et al., 1988; Joseph & 
Tanaka, 2003; Langdell, 1978; Tantam et al., 1989). Further, regions of the brains that 
are associated with both face and expertise processing are known to be structurally 
and functionally different in ASD (Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce et al., 2001; Schultz 
et al., 2000; Van Kooten et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2004). Yet, a case study of an 
adolescent with ASD who developed expertise with a particular object raises the 
possibility that markers of expertise may be observed when individuals with ASD 
process non-face objects of expertise. Specifically, Grelotti and colleagues (2005) 
found that this individual recruited areas of the brain typically associated with face 
expertise when processing his particular object of expertise and, yet, did not recruit 
these neural structures when processing faces.  
Although the term ‘expertise’ has been defined in many different ways in 
previous research, for the sake of clarity, expertise will be defined here as a level of 
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ability at which the recognition of upright instances of an object can occur quickly 
and accurately. Because it is difficult to define what constitutes quick and accurate 
recognition across individuals, expertise in the current study will be behaviourally 
defined as the level of proficiency when recognition of a stimulus on the level of an 
individual exemplar  (e.g, ‘Lassie’) is equivalent or superior to the ability to recognize 
the broader category of objects (e.g., ‘dog’) (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991).  
  For most typically developing adults, this level of ability is achieved through 
the development of a perceptual strategy referred to as ‘holistic processing’. Although 
there is currently no consensus on the definition of this term (Maurer, Le Grand, & 
Mondloch, 2002), we will use ‘holistic processing’ to refer to the automatic 
perception of the whole image or gestalt which involves the simultaneous perception 
of individual parts as well as the spatial relations among parts (Bartlett & Searcy, 
1993; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). It is important to note that expertise could also be 
achieved through ‘local processing’. Local processing involves the examination of 
individual features or parts of an object separately. Although the development of 
holistic processing is often associated with the acquisition of expertise and it is often 
assumed that holistic processing strategies are essential to achieving a level of expert 
ability (Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997), these assumptions have yet to be empirically 
validated. Accordingly, the current study will allow for the possibility that expertise 
may be achieved through holistic or local strategies by examining expertise and 
processing strategy independently.  
One approach for measuring the extent to which an individual employs 
holistic versus local strategies is to quantify the degree to which an individual 
demonstrates an inversion effect. The inversion effect is measured by comparing 
performance on upright versus inverted stimuli. Inversion of an object 
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disproportionately disrupts the extraction of holistic information (Farah, Tanaka, & 
Drain, 1995; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; Leder & Bruce, 2000), while local 
information remains relatively intact (Bruyer & Coget, 1987; Freire et al., 2000). 
Although the inversion effect is typically measured with faces, an inversion effect has 
also been observed with non-face objects of expertise (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; 
Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 1998; Moore et al., 2006). 
In line with evidence that individuals with ASD tend to employ local 
processing strategies over holistic processing strategies (Behrmann et al., 2006; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997), there is significant evidence that adults with ASD lack 
a face inversion effect (Hobson et al., 1988; Langdell, 1978; Tantam Monaghan, 
Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989). Yet, several more recent studies have found that 
individuals with ASD may, in fact, have an intact face inversion effect (Lahaie et al., 
2006; Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 2007; Scherf, Behrmann, Minshew, & Luna, 
2008; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). These conflicting results suggest that further 
investigation on this topic is needed, particularly studies which compare the face 
inversion effect to inversion effects with other types of complex objects of expertise. 
 Despite these inconsistent findings regarding the inversion effect, it is clear 
that in most tasks and across most real-life situations face processing in ASD is 
atypical and impaired relative to controls (Behrmann et al., 2006; Sasson, 2006). This 
observation raises an important theoretical question: do individuals with ASD lack the 
ability to develop perceptual expertise with any complex object, or is this impairment 
specific to faces? In other words, with sufficient motivation, are individuals with ASD 
capable of developing face expertise to the level of their typically developing peers, or 
does a more general cognitive/perceptual deficit involved in the actual process of 
gaining expertise prevent them from doing so? Furthermore, if individuals with ASD 
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are able to acquire expertise with a non-face object, what type of processing strategies 
will they employ as experts?  
Hypotheses related to the lack of face expertise in ASD can be broadly 
categorized as domain-general or face-specific hypotheses. The former set of 
hypotheses, which we will refer to as domain-general hypotheses, contends that a 
pervasive underlying cognitive or perceptual deficit (or deficits) disrupts the 
acquisition of expertise (Behrmann et al., 2006; Davies, Bishop, Manstead, & 
Tantam, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006). According to this view, this deficit is not face-
specific, but rather is most evident with faces, as faces are highly complex and often 
require rapid identification. Alternatively, a second set of hypotheses, which will be 
referred to as face-specific hypotheses, purport that individuals with ASD have the 
basic cognitive and perceptual skills necessary for developing perceptual expertise, 
yet simply lack the social motivation to develop such a skill with faces (Dawson, 
Carver, Meltzoff, Panagiotides, McPartland, & Webb 2002; Grelotti et al., 2002). 
Supporting this view, the case study reported by Grelotti and colleagues (2005) 
suggests that, with sufficient motivation, it is possible for an individual with ASD to 
achieve expertise with non-face objects.   
The primary aim of the current study is to shed light on the nature of the face 
processing deficit in ASD by examining the extent to which it is attributable to a lack 
of expertise with faces specifically or to a more general perceptual or cognitive 
atypicality. By examining perceptual expertise with a non-face object, this 
experimental paradigm effectively controls for the possible group differences in the 
quality and quantity of experience with the object of expertise (whether face or non-
face) and the reward value associated with the object.   
  6 
The more specific objectives of the study are: (1) To investigate the extent to 
which individuals with ASD can develop perceptual expertise with non-face objects, 
in relation to controls, in order to determine if the process of developing expertise is 
atypical in ASD; (2) To examine the underlying mechanisms and strategies employed 
with objects of expertise in individuals with and without ASD.  
To address these aims, two specific hypotheses will be tested. First, we predict 
that individuals with ASD will develop perceptual expertise with Greebles to the same 
extent and at the same rate as typical individuals. This prediction is based on previous 
work involving Greeble training in individuals with prosopagnosia, which indicates 
that perceptual expertise can develop in the absence of a face processing expertise 
(Duchaine, Dingle, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2004). Secondly, we predict that 
individuals with ASD will rely on different strategies than the control group to reach 
this level of expertise. That is, individuals with ASD will not demonstrate an 
inversion effect to the same extent as controls do when processing objects of 
expertise. We base this hypothesis on previous research indicating that individuals 
with ASD show a general tendency to process the local details or parts of an object 
rather than perceiving the image as a whole (Happe, 1999; Lopez, Donnelly, Hadwin, 
& Leekam, 2004).  
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
The participants enrolled in this study originally included 18 adults with a 
diagnosis of an ASD and 20 control adults without a family history of ASD. All 
participants gave informed consent prior to study participation. All participants with 
ASD were recruited via a database compiled by the Autism Research Centre, 
composed of individuals who have volunteered via the Autism Research Centre 
website (www.autismresearchcentre.com) to receive information about opportunities 
for research participation. The control participants were recruited through either the 
Autism Research Centre database or printed advertisements placed in the community. 
Inclusion criteria required that participants in both groups were between the ages of 
18 to 60 years, reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received IQ scores 
of 85 or above. In order to assess IQ, all participants were given the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999), except one participant in 
the ASD group. Exclusion criteria for both groups included history of psychosis, 
epilepsy, or traumatic brain injury.  
For the ASD group, all participants were required to have received a clinical 
diagnosis of either autism or Asperger syndrome (AS) from a licensed clinical 
psychologist or physician based upon standard DSM-IV criteria (DSM-IV, APA 
1994). Of the participants included in the final analysis, nine were diagnosed with AS 
and three were diagnosed with autism. As expected, the ASD group differed 
significantly from the typical group in Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores, t (22) 
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= -7.77, p < .001. The mean, standard deviations, and range of scores on the AQ for 
each group are displayed in Table 1.   
Because the final ASD group included seven males and five females (while 
the control included six males and six females), independent t-tests were conducted to 
determine the potential effect of gender on outcome measures. These tests revealed 
that males and females for both groups combined did not show significantly different 
performance on the either response time (p > .10) or accuracy for the inversion effect 
task (p > .10). Furthermore, independent t-tests between males and females within 
each diagnostic group revealed no effect of gender within either group for response 
time (p > .10) or accuracy outcome measures (p > .10). 
Over the course of the two-week training period, six individuals with ASD and 
six controls withdrew from the study. Most participants cited the high time demands 
of the study as the reason for withdrawal. No significant differences between 
individuals who completed the study and those who withdrew were detected for either 
response time (RT) (p > .10) or accuracy measures on the pre-training inversion effect 
task  (p > .10). Additionally, neither age nor FIQ scores were significantly correlated 
with response time (p > .10) or accuracy measures on the inversion effect task either 
before or after training (p > .10). Additionally, two individuals in the control group 
did not meet pre-specified criterion for expertise and were therefore excluded from 
analysis. The participants included in the final analysis were 12 individuals with ASD 
and 12 individuals without ASD. The two groups did not differ significantly in age, 
full-scale IQ, verbal IQ, or performance IQ scores (p > .10; see Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
  9 
 
Table 1.Participant Information for Control and ASD groups 
 
  
Group 
 
Control Group (n= 12) 
[Mean (± SD)] 
ASD Group (n= 12) 
[Mean (± SD)] 
Age (years) 
28.92 (± 6.42) 
(Range: 18 - 39) 
28.83 (± 9.29) 
(Range: 19 - 53) 
Sex 
6 females 
 6 males 
5 females 
 7 males 
Full Scale IQ 
117.67 (± 8.28) 
(Range: 101 - 129) 
114.82 (± 12.48) 
(Range: 91 - 129) 
Verbal IQ 
115.42 (± 8.91) 
(Range: 99 - 128) 
117.18 (±13.50) 
(Range: 96 - 137) 
Performance IQ 
 115.42 (± 10.24) 
(Range: 101 - 134) 
 109.55 (± 15.94) 
(Range: 81 - 134) 
Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ) 
 16.25 (± 4.82) * 
(Range: 7 - 24) 
35.75 (± 8.52) * 
(Range: 27 - 46) 
*p < .001 
 
Measures 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) is self-
report measure of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001). Because autistic traits are likely to be on a continuum (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Frith, 1991; Wing, 1988), this questionnaire measures these traits in populations 
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with and without a diagnosis of ASD. The AQ consists of 50 items with 10 items each 
measuring: social skills, communication, imagination, attention to detail, and 
attentional switching. Items are in a forced-choice format and require participants to 
read a statement and choose one of the following: ‘strongly agree’, ‘slightly agree’, 
‘slightly disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’. Questionnaires were completed on our 
website before beginning the Greeble Training program. Possible scores on this 
measure range from 0 to 50, with higher scores indicating a greater number of traits 
associated with ASD.  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI) is a brief assessment of intelligence that consists of four 
subtests: Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, Similarities, and Block Design (Wechsler, 
1999). The WASI can be administered to individuals from 6 to 89 years. The WASI 
yields the following standard scores with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
15: Full-Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ), Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ), and 
Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ).  
 
Materials  
The stimuli used in this study consisted of 40 unfamiliar faces and 40 
unfamiliar non-face objects (Greebles). All images were color photographs converted 
to greyscale and presented on a black background. Twenty images from each class of 
stimuli were presented in the session before expertise training and then used in the 
training program, while the remaining twenty images from each class were presented 
in the session after expertise training.  
Greebles are a set of novel objects consisting of a central body with four 
appendages (see Figure 1) (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1998). Because it 
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has been argued that Greebles’ face-like appearance facilitates the recruitment of face 
processing mechanisms (Kanwisher, 2000), we chose to use asymmetric Greebles for 
this particular study, as this set of stimuli do not have a part configuration resembling 
faces (Rossion et al., 2004). Like faces, however, these stimuli, are a set of 
homogenous objects with the same first-order relationships among parts. Furthermore, 
with extensive experience, participants can develop sensitivity to configural 
alterations of Greeble parts (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). The 40 Greeble stimuli in this 
experiment were obtained from Michael J. Tarr at Brown University 
(http://www.tarrlab.org/). Greebles can be categorized on the ‘family’ level, according 
to the shape of their main body, or on the ‘individual’ level according to the shape and 
positioning of their appendages. Each individual Greeble was assigned a unique 
nonsense word name (e.g., ‘pimo’) (see Figure 1 for the distinction between family 
and individual level categorization). The 40 Greebles used in this experiment were 
from five different ‘families’ and two distinct ‘genders’. 
The 40 faces in this experiment were obtained from the Max-Planck Institute 
for Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany (Troje & Bülthoff, 1996). The 
faces were cropped into an oval shape to remove the hairline, neck and ears and then 
converted to greyscale. Although the oval crop was largely determined by the size and 
shape of the individual faces in order to prevent distortion, the images were also 
adjusted in order to minimize differences in size and luminance. The faces were then 
retouched using Adobe Photoshop ® CS3 software to remove any salient features on 
the surface of the face. The faces included 20 females and 20 males, each with a 
neutral facial expression. Faces were rotated horizontally at 30˚ angles from the 
frontal face view (20 faced to the right and 20 faced to the left), with eye gaze 
oriented in the same direction as the head. Rotated faces were chosen for this study, in 
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order to control for symmetry between faces and Greebles. Importantly, there is 
evidence that rotation does not significantly affect holistic or featural processing 
(McKone, 2008). All faces were scaled to be approximately the same size as the 
Greebles. Face stimuli were presented at a visual angle of 7.5° (height) x 3.9° (width). 
The Greeble stimuli subtended 7.2° x 3.9°.  
 
 
    
               (a)                        (b)      (c)          (d) 
Figure 1.  Examples of individual Greebles used in the training program and 
laboratory sessions. From right to left: Biff (from the Nalli family), Harga (from the 
Nalli family), Zadra (from the Yuju family), and Uster (from the Yuju family). 
Greebles (a) and (b) are members of the same family and Greebles (c) and (d) are 
members of a different family and, consequently, each of these pairs have the same 
central body shape. Greebles (a) and (d) are members of the same gender and 
Greebles (b) and (c) are members of a different gender and, consequently, each of 
these pairs have the same orientation of for their appendages (either all appendages 
are facing up or all appendages are facing down). The shape and configuration of the 
appendages is different for each individual Greeble.  
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by the University of Cambridge Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent was obtained from all participants 
before participation in the study. The procedure of this experiment was adapted from 
the procedures of Gauthier and colleagues (1998), Gauthier & Tarr (2002), and 
Rossion and colleagues (2002), in order to compare our results to previous studies in 
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the typical population. Accordingly, this experiment was comprised of three parts: an 
initial inversion effect task in the laboratory before expertise training, ten sessions of 
expertise training, and a second inversion effect task after participants completed the 
training.  
Pre-training inversion effect task. In the initial laboratory session, all 
participants performed a computerized inversion effect task with faces and Greebles. 
After a block of 20 practice trials, participants completed 12 blocks of 40 trials each 
(480 trials in total). The sequence of each trial was as follows: a centered fixation 
cross for 200 ms, a blank screen for 550 ms, the first stimulus of a pair for 1000 ms, a 
perceptual mask for 250 ms, and the second stimulus for 1000 ms (Figure 2). A 
perceptual mask, which consisted of a scrambled face or Greeble, was presented 
between the two stimuli to prevent retinal persistence in matching the two stimuli. A 
blank screen followed the second stimulus for 1800 ms, at which point, participants 
were asked to indicate whether the stimuli were the same or different by pressing a 
labelled key on the keyboard. The location of the keys for ‘same’ and ‘different’ was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Of the twenty faces and the twenty Greebles in the session, each stimulus 
appeared at least once during each block (either in upright or inverted orientation). 
Within the 40 trials of each block, there were 20 trials with each class of stimuli 
(faces and Greebles), half of which were in the upright orientation and half in the 
inverted orientation. In each of these conditions, half of the trials were with female 
faces or Greebles and half of the trials were with male faces or Greebles. Accordingly, 
each condition (e.g., ‘upright male Greeble’) occurred exactly five times in each 
block. The entire session took participants 45-60 minutes to complete.  
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Figure 2. Example of the inversion effect task sequence. 
 
Greeble training program. The Greeble training program consisted of ten 
sessions completed online over the course of two weeks. The sessions were completed 
using a personal computer, a work computer, or a computer at the library. The 
training focused on teaching participants to categorize a set of Greeble stimuli on both 
the family level and the individual level. Participants were instructed to complete all 
ten sessions in two weeks and to complete no more than one session per day. As 
sufficient motivation may be the driving force behind the development of expertise 
(Grelotti et al., 2002), participants were offered a cash bonus if they were one of the 
three participants in each group with the highest level of accuracy for upright 
Greebles in the post-training inversion effect task.  
An internet-based training program was developed for this study in order to 
make participation possible for participants with ASD who did not live near our 
laboratory. The program was accessed via the Autism Research Centre website 
(www.autismresearchcentre.com). Participants’ progress in the training program 
could be monitored daily, as their activity in the training program was loaded onto a 
database. However, it is important to note that internet-based training likely 
introduces more variance in both the training experience and in the response time data 
compared to a standardized training program conducted in a laboratory. Such variance 
1000 ms 250 ms 550 ms 200 ms 1000 ms 
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may be unrelated to behaviour, but instead due to the processor speed, the type of 
operating system, the bandwidth of internet connection, the number of different 
programs running simultaneously, and the integration of keyboard input (McGraw, 
Tew, & Williams, 2000; Reips, 2000). The training experience of each participant 
may also be slightly different, as stimulus presentation varies according to different 
display settings (Krantz, 2000). Differences among computing systems which may 
affect perception of the stimuli can include screen dimensions (height and width), 
operating system type and edition, browser type and edition, and display settings, 
such as colour quality and screen resolution (Reips, 2002).  
Several precautions were taken to minimize these potentially confounding 
factors. First, all images were downloaded to the participants’ computers before the 
start of the training. Although the loading time may vary substantially according to 
the bandwidth of the Internet connection, preloading the stimuli virtually eliminates 
any timing differences due to bandwidth differences (McGraw et al., 2000). 
Additionally, all participants were given clear written instructions for logging on to 
the website and asked to contact the researcher if the training instructions were 
unclear in any way or if they had any questions about the tasks in the sessions. Before 
beginning the session, participants were instructed to close all other programs running 
simultaneously. Participants were also asked to use the same computer throughout the 
training and to use Internet Explorer if available. Information was also collected 
regarding the computer, the operating system, and the Internet connection that each 
participant used throughout training. Participants were also required to use a computer 
less than 10 years old with an operating system of Windows 2000, Mac OS X, or 
another equivalent or more advanced system. Additionally, because the main variable 
of interest (the point at which response time on the individual level was equivalent or 
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significantly faster than response time on the family level) was first calculated within 
each individual subject before comparisons were made across individuals or groups, 
any source of stable variability among computers, operating systems, or internet 
bandwidth in this variable was controlled for to some extent. 
Over the course of training, participants were introduced to five Greeble 
families with four individual Greebles in each family. The five different family names 
were introduced in the first session. In this session, all exemplars in the training set 
were assigned a family name and all Greebles were presented with their family name 
for participants to study. Participants practiced categorization by family name 
throughout the training. Because family categorization depends upon only one feature 
of the Greeble (the main body shape), this judgement should be equally difficult for 
novices as for experts as soon as the association between name and body shape has 
been learned. On the other hand, discrimination on the individual level should be 
more difficult for novices than for experts. The individual names were introduced 
over the course of the first four sessions, with five new Greebles being presented in 
each session. Both family names and individual names used in the training were 
nonsense words (e.g., ‘plok’, ‘camar’, ‘snodi’). After the first five sessions, 
participants practiced with all Greeble family and individual names for the remaining 
five sessions.  
Each training session took about an hour to complete and included a 
combination of seven tasks designed by Gauthier and colleagues (1998) (see 
Appendix A). These tasks tested participants’ ability to recognize and identify upright 
Greebles both with and without corrective feedback. Two of these tasks required 
participants to passively study Greebles paired with their family or individual names. 
Another task asked participants to categorize the Greebles on the family level with 
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corrective feedback. This feedback consisted of a ‘beep’ following an incorrect reply 
and the task did not continue until participants had responded correctly. In addition to 
the family names, three tasks were completed to learn the individual names. In the 
first task, participants were presented with the Greeble and its individual name and 
asked to press the key that corresponded to the Greeble’s name. The second task also 
required participants to categorize Greebles according to individual name but without 
the name available. Corrective feedback was provided in this task as participants 
heard a ‘beep’ for an incorrect reply and were required to try again until they chose 
the correct answer. The third task for individual names required participants to name 
Greebles without corrective feedback. In every session, tasks to learn both family and 
individual names were completed.  
In each training session, participants were tested with a verification task 
(Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). Each instance of the verification task tested participants on 
the identification of all Greeble family and individual names that had been learned at 
that point in the training. In the first four sessions, unnamed Greebles were also 
included in this task. The correct pairing for an unnamed Greeble was a ‘NIL’ label. 
For example, if an unnamed Greeble was matched with a ‘NIL’ label, participants 
should have indicated that this pair was correct. In this task, either a family name or 
an individual name was presented for 1000 ms and then a Greeble followed that either 
matched or did not match the label. The Greeble remained onscreen until the 
participant made a response. Participants were asked to press the ‘C’ key if the label 
correctly matched the Greeble and the ‘I’ key if the label was incorrect. The first 
session included two blocks of the verification task. Every remaining session included 
four blocks of the verification task per session. Each block of the verification task 
included 120 trials with each Greeble being presented three times during the task. 
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Participants were not given feedback on their answers and were not given the 
opportunity to correct themselves after providing a response. 
In order to remove the influence of trials in which participants were not 
engaged in the task, response times less than 100 ms or greater than 5000 ms were not 
included in the analysis. Furthermore, for any instance of the task in which the 
accuracy was less than chance, that particular block was excluded from analysis. The 
main variables of interest were the mean response time in identifying Greebles on the 
family level and the mean response time in identifying Greebles on the individual 
level. Response time was measured as the time (in ms) from the presentation of the 
Greeble until a response was made. Accuracy over the entire session was also 
measured to determine whether or not participants were attending to the task so that 
response time could be interpreted as a meaningful representation of the participants’ 
knowledge of Greeble names. Accuracy was measured as the percentage of trials that 
were correct in each block of the verification task for both family level and individual 
level categorization. Percentage correct scores were calculated by determining the 
percent of Greebles correctly identified on both the family level and individual level 
in each block of the verification task and then averaging these blocks for all 
participants in a group to determine overall accuracy for each group.  However, in line 
with previous studies of expertise (e.g., Gauthier et al., 1998), accuracy measures 
from this task were not used to determine participants’ level of expertise. 
Post-training inversion effect task. When participants had completed all 
sessions of the training program, they returned to complete a post-training inversion 
effect task. Participants completed this session approximately two weeks after 
completion of the first laboratory session. The procedure of this session was nearly 
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identical to the first, but with a new, unfamiliar set of stimuli (20 new faces and 20 
new Greebles).  
 
Analytic Approach 
Due to the complexity of this study design, all variables of interest for this 
study are listed in Table 2, along with definitions for each variable and how the 
variable was used in the analyses.  
 
 
Table 2. Variables of Interest 
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Table 2. Variables of Interest (continued).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (Continued). 
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In order to address the first hypothesis that individuals with ASD would 
develop expertise with Greebles in the same time period as the control group, the 
point of expertise was calculated for each individual participant. As in previous 
studies of perceptual expertise, the point of expertise was calculated by conducting 
pairwise t-tests to measure differences between the mean response time for family 
level identification and the mean response time for individual level identification in 
each block of the verification task for a particular session (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). 
The mean response times for both individual and family level categorization were 
calculated by averaging response times for each type of categorization across all trials 
of a block (120 trials total) for each individual participant. Pairwise t-tests were then 
conducted on these mean response times for each participant on each block of the 
verification task. The ‘point of expertise’ was defined as the block of the verification 
task in which the mean response time for the individual categorization of a Greeble 
was either not significantly different (p > .05) or was significantly faster than the 
mean response time for the family categorization (p < .05). In order for a participant 
to be considered an ‘expert’ for the current study, the point of expertise had to be 
achieved in at least two blocks of the verification task in a single session. The point of 
expertise was marked as the first block in which the participant reached the criterion 
for expertise.  
Only training sessions occurring after all Greebles had been introduced were 
examined in order to determine the point of expertise. Because all Greebles were 
introduced by session four, only sessions four to ten were included in this analysis to 
determine the point of expertise (and the first three sessions were not examined). As 
sessions four through ten each had four blocks of the verification task, each block in a 
session was designated as a fraction of the session number for analysis. For session 
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five, for example, the four blocks were designated as 5.0, 5.25, 5.5, and 5.75 for the 
first, second, third, and fourth blocks, respectively. These more precise measurements 
of the point of expertise for each participant were then averaged separately for the 
ASD and control groups to determine the mean point of expertise within each group. 
Independent t-tests were then conducted to determine if the mean point of expertise 
was different between the two groups. Independent t-tests were also conducted on the 
mean accuracy scores for each group in order to ensure that these results were not 
attributable to group differences in the speed-accuracy trade-off.   
To address the second hypothesis that participants with ASD would employ 
different perceptual strategies than control participants, the results of the inversion 
effect were analyzed using both between-group and within-group statistical tests to 
examine how response time and accuracy data for faces and Greebles changed for 
each diagnostic group as a result of training. Both response time and accuracy data 
were collected from the inversion effect task. The variables of interest for this task 
were mean response time and percentage correct in identifying faces and Greebles in 
the upright and inverted orientations. In analyzing response time data, response times 
occurring after the subsequent trial began (i.e., any response times greater than 2800 
ms) and incorrect responses were excluded from analysis. Because most responses 
were correct (i.e., the average percent correct scores were above 80% for all 
conditions in both groups) and response times over 2800 ms occurred less than 5% of 
the time, nearly all of the data collected was included in the analysis.  
Because the development of an inversion effect would ideally be measured by 
examining the interactions among several variables from the inversion effect task 
(particularly the session x group x type of stimulus x orientation interaction), an 
ANOVA involving all of these factors was initially planned. However, exploratory 
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analyses of the response time and accuracy data from the inversion effect task 
indicated that several variables that would be included in an omnibus ANOVA (the 
Greeble inversion effect in RT before training, the face inversion effect in RT after 
training and the accuracy measures for inverted Greebles and upright faces) violated 
the homogeneity of variance assumption for parametric tests (Levene’s test for 
Equality of Variance, p < .05). Accordingly, a single ANOVA was not conducted to 
examine interactions among inversion effect task variables. Although a non-
parametric approach was considered, this approach was not taken, as the independent 
t-test has been found to be more powerful than its nonparametric alternative (the 
Mann-Whitney U-test) when sample sizes are equal (Zimmerman, 1987). 
Consequently, between-group differences were examined through separate 
independent t-tests for the face inversion effect and Greeble inversion effect and 
within-group differences were examined through multiple pairwise t-tests.  Both 
response time and accuracy data from the inversion effect task were analyzed, first, 
for differences between diagnostic groups using independent t-tests with variables that 
did not violate the homogeneity of variance assumption and, second, within-group 
differences were examined using pairwise t-tests with variables that may have 
contributed to any significant between-group differences detected by independent t-
tests for either the face inversion effect or Greeble inversion effect.  
In line with previous studies of the inversion effect (Carey & Diamond, 1994; 
Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002), the face inversion effect (FIE) was defined as 
a difference score of the response time (or percent correct) for an upright face minus 
the response time (or percent correct) for an inverted face. Similarly, the Greeble 
inversion effect (GIE) was defined as the response time (or percent correct) for an 
upright Greeble minus the response time (or percent correct) for an inverted Greeble.  
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To examine between-group differences, the two groups were compared on a 
measure referred to as the FIE treatment effect and the GIE treatment effect. These 
treatment effects were defined as the extent to which the face and Greeble inversion 
effects changed as result of training (by subtracting the inversion effect before 
training from the inversion effect after training), as this measure did not violate the 
homogeneity of variance assumption of the independent t-test (Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variance, p >.05).  Both the FIE and GIE treatment effects were examined 
for response time and accuracy data. The FIE and GIE treatment effects were 
calculated as follows for both response time and accuracy measures:  
 
Face Inversion effect (FIE) treatment effect = [FIE After (Upright Face After – 
Inverted Face After)] – [FIE Before (Upright Face Before – Inverted Face Before)] 
 
Greeble Inversion Effect (GIE) treatment effect = [GIE After (Upright Greeble After 
– Inverted Greeble After)] – [GIE Before (Upright Greeble Before – Inverted Greeble 
After)] 
 
If a between-group difference was detected in either the FIE or the GIE 
treatment effect for response time or accuracy data, pairwise t-tests were then 
conducted within each group to determine the source of this difference. These 
pairwise tests were only conducted when a significant between-group difference was 
detected with a particular class of stimuli and only involved variables that may have 
contributed to the between-group difference. In other words, if a significant effect of 
training was detected with the response times for the Greeble inversion effect, 
pairwise t-tests were conducted to examine the relations among upright and inverted 
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Greebles before and after training in the response time data only, as all of these 
variables may have contributed to the between-group difference. Similarly, if a 
between-group difference was found in the FIE treatment effect, pairwise tests were 
conducted to examine the relations among upright and inverted faces before and after 
training. These tests were performed to determine if the between-group difference 
reflected a change in the presence or absence of an inversion effect or simply a 
change in performance with either upright or inverted stimuli as a result of training. 
Accordingly, these comparisons included: tests to determine whether an inversion 
effect was present before training [upright face or Greeble (before) and inverted face 
or Greeble (before)] or after training [upright face or Greeble (before) and inverted 
face or Greeble (after)], along with before and after comparisons to determine if there 
was a change as a result of training for upright [upright face or Greeble (before) and 
upright face or Greeble (after)] and inverted faces or Greebles [inverted face or 
Greeble (before) and inverted face or Greeble (after)]. For these tests, a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was applied to reduce the chance of a Type I 
error, adjusting the alpha to p = .0125 (.05/4). 
Finally, to further substantiate the findings of the pairwise comparisons above, 
additional pairwise t-tests were also conducted when between-group differences were 
detected in the FIE or GIE.  As with the pairwise tests described above, these tests 
were conducted with face inversion effects only when a between-group difference 
was detected with either the FIE treatment effect or with Greeble inversion effects 
only when a between-group difference was found in the GIE treatment effect. In other 
words, only the inversion effects that may have contributed to the between-group 
difference in treatment effect were examined. These tests were performed to confirm 
that the face or Greeble inversion effect significantly changed as a result of training. 
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Thus, if a significant between-group effect was detected with the GIE treatment 
effect, pairwise t-tests were conducted to compare the Greeble inversion effect before 
training to the Greeble inversion effect after training in each group. Similarly, if a 
between-group difference was detected in the FIE treatment effect, pairwise t-tests 
were conducted to compare the face inversion effect before training to the face 
inversion effect after training in each group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  27 
CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
Training Results 
Response time and accuracy data from the verification task of the training 
program were used to measure level of expertise during the program (Figure 3). Of 
the 24 participants who achieved expertise, two control participants had incomplete 
data from the first three sessions due to a website error. These data points were not 
included in the analyses. Independent t-tests indicated that the mean point of expertise 
was not significantly different between the ASD and the control group, t (22) = -1.08, 
p = .29. In the ASD group, the expertise criterion (the ‘point of expertise’) was 
reached after a mean of 5.33 sessions (range = 4.25- 9.75, SD = 1.87), while the 
control group reached this criterion after a mean of 4.71 sessions (range = 4.25- 6.75, 
SD = 0.73). Expertise was also maintained across sessions in both groups, as the mean 
response time for family level categorization was not significantly faster than the 
mean response time for individual level categorization after the point of achieving 
expertise, t (22) = -0.26, p= .80. Further, Independent t-tests revealed that the mean 
accuracy (percent correct) in naming Greebles during the verification task for the 
ASD group (M = 91.57, SD = 11.75) was not significantly different from the mean 
accuracy of the control group (M = 90.47, SD = 10.79), p >.10.  
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Figure 3. Performance during the expertise training program over the course of ten 
sessions for participants with and without ASD. The point where the mean response 
time for family level categorization meets the mean response time for individual level 
categorization is the ‘point of expertise’ (when expertise with Greebles is acquired). 
Arrows indicate the point of expertise for each group.  
 
Inversion Effect Task: Response Time 
The mean response times (and standard deviations) for each stimulus 
condition involved in the inversion effect task are listed in Table 3. For response time 
data, independent t-tests (two-tailed) indicated that, while there was no between-group 
difference in how the FIE changed as a result of training (FIE treatment effect), t (22) 
= 0.46, p = .65, a nearly significant difference was found in the GIE treatment effect, t 
(22) = -2.02, p= .056. Because this test may have been underpowered due to the small 
sample size, pairwise t-tests (two-tailed) were conducted to better understand why the 
group difference in the GIE treatment effect might have trended towards significance.  
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Table 3. Mean Response Times and Standard Deviations (in milliseconds) for Upright 
and Inverted Faces and Greebles 
 
          
  Control Group ASD Group 
Before 
Training 
After 
Training 
Before 
Training 
After 
Training 
 
 
Type 
 
 
Orientation [Mean (± SD)] [Mean (± SD)] 
Upright 704.69 
(± 106.33) 
644.46  
(± 118.27) 
768.28   
(± 218.82) 
686.94 
(±203.14 ) 
Faces 
Inverted 762.89 
(±114.66) 
708.62  
(± 114.68) 
818.21 
(± 202.23) 
736.69  
(± 201.77) 
Upright 
 
749.33 
(±110.17) 
680.68* 
 (± 132.01) 
806.99 
(± 219.36) 
710.95  
(± 208.53) 
Greebles 
Inverted 
 
755.99 
 (± 114.73) 
706.84* 
(±140.98) 
837.55 
( ± 247.81) 
747.67 
 (± 237.42) 
* Variables that contribute to significant inversion effects, p < .0125 
 
Four pairwise t-tests were conducted for each diagnostic group, in order to 
understand the effect of training on the GIE. As expected, the control group was not 
found to have a significant Greeble inversion effect before training, t (11) = -1.90  p = 
.30 . However, a significant Greeble inversion effect was found after training in the 
control group, t (11) = -4.09, p = .002, as significantly faster response times for 
upright Greebles (M = 680.68, SD = 132.01) compared to inverted Greebles (M = 
706.84, SD = 140.98) were found after training (see Figure 4). When response times 
with upright Greebles was compared before versus after training, this difference did 
not reach significance given the alpha level set by the Bonferroni correction, yet it did 
show a trend towards significance, t (11) = 2.54, p = .029. A significant difference in 
response times, was also not detected with inverted Greebles before versus after 
training, t (11) = 1.75, p = .11.   
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Figure 4. Changes in the Greeble inversion effect (GIE) as a result of expertise 
training for individuals with and without ASD. The GIE is calculated by subtracting 
the mean response time for upright Greebles from the mean response time for inverted 
Greebles. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
For the ASD group, no significant inversion effects were detected for 
Greebles, yet trends towards significance were detected both before, t (11) = -1.87, p 
= .09, and after training t (11) = 2.85, p = .02 (see Figure 4). Additionally, a 
significant effect of training was found for both upright Greebles, t (11) = 4.33, p = 
.001, and inverted Greebles, t (11) = 3.10, p = .010. These differences reflect 
significantly faster response times for upright Greebles after training (M = 710.95, SD 
= 208.53) compared to before training (M = 806.99, SD = 219.36) and significantly 
faster response times for inverted Greebles after training (M = 747.67, SD = 237.41) 
than before training (M = 837.55, SD = 247.81).  
In order to further substantiate these findings, pairwise t-tests (two-tailed) 
were conducted to examine the effect of training on the GIE in both the control group 
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and the ASD group. These tests found that, in the control group, the Greeble inversion 
effect was significantly greater after training than before training, t (11) = -2.45, p = 
.03, while, in the ASD group, there was no difference in the GIE as a result of 
training, t (11) = -0.46, p = .65. 
 
Inversion Effect Task: Accuracy 
The mean percentage correct scores (and standard deviations) for the inversion 
effect task are reported in Table 4. For accuracy data, independent t-tests (two-tailed) 
detected a significant between-group difference in the FIE treatment effect, t (22) = 
2.30, p = .03, but not in the GIE treatment effect, t (22) = 0.81, p = .42. These results 
suggest that, for accuracy measures, the effect of training on the FIE is different in 
control group compared to the ASD group, while the effect of training on the GIE is 
not different across groups.  
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Table 4 
 
 Mean Percentage Correct Scores and Standard Deviations for Upright and Inverted 
Faces and Greebles 
 
  Control Group ASD Group 
Before 
Training 
After 
Training 
Before 
Training 
After  
Training 
 
 
Type 
 
 
Orientation 
[Mean (± SD)] [Mean (± SD)] 
Upright 91.32* 
 (± 6.92) 
95.97* 
 (± 2.53) 
87.64  
(± 13.04) 
87.57 
 (±16.04 ) 
Faces 
Inverted 84.79*  
(±9.02) 
83.68* 
 (± 7.40) 
80.97 
 (± 9.91) 
82.15  
(± 10.30) 
Upright 
 
83.75 
 (±8.61) 
89.72 
 (± 5.93) 
82.50 
(± 12.51) 
87.78 
 (± 9.34) 
Greebles 
Inverted 
 
83.26 
 (± 7.23) 
91.11  
(± 6.77) 
73.98 
(± 12.71) 
88.33 
 (± 11.22) 
* Variables that contribute to significant inversion effects, p < .0125 
 
To examine how the FIE may have differed across groups, four pairwise t-
tests (two-tailed) were conducted to investigate differences in accuracy for upright 
and inverted faces. For the control group, a significant face inversion effect was 
detected before training, t (11) = 3.56, p = .004, and after training, t (11) = 6.70, p < 
.001. Before training, the average percent correct score for upright faces was 91.32 % 
(SD = 6.92), while the average percentage for inverted faces was 84.79 % (SD = 
9.02). Similarly, after training, the average percentage correct score was greater for 
upright faces (M = 95.97, SD = 2.53) compared to inverted faces (M = 83.68, SD = 
7.40) after training. However, no significant effects of training were found for upright 
faces, t (11) = -2.17, p = .05, or inverted faces, t (11) = 0.40, p = .70, when accuracy 
was compared for each of these categories before training versus after training 
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For the ASD group, a face inversion effect was not detected either before 
training, t (11) = 2.30, p = .04, or after training, t (11) = 1.55, p = .15. However, the 
face inversion effect before training did show a trend towards significance. No 
significant changes in accuracy with upright faces, t (11) = 0.30, p = .98, or inverted 
faces t (11) = -0.94, p = .37, were detected as a result of training. Figure 5 illustrates 
these findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Changes in the face inversion effect (FIE) as a result of training for 
individuals with and without ASD. FIE is calculated by subtracting the average 
percent correct score for inverted faces from the average percent correct score for 
upright faces. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
To provide further support for these results, pairwise t-tests (two-tailed) were 
conducted to compare the FIE before training to the FIE after training within each 
group. These tests indicated that, while there was no difference in the FIE before 
versus after training in the ASD group, t (11) = 0.48, p = .64, the FIE in the control 
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group was significantly greater after training than before training, t (11) = -3.69, p = 
.004.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The findings of the current study indicate that, when provided with sufficient 
experience, individuals with ASD are indeed capable of developing perceptual 
expertise with complex objects. The acquisition of expertise with Greebles is evident 
in the qualitative shift that occurs in the recognition of Greebles on an individual level 
in individuals with and without ASD. As illustrated by Figure 3, individuals with 
ASD achieved this expertise criterion after approximately the same quality and 
quantity of experience as the control group.  
However, these findings also suggest that individuals with ASD employ 
qualitatively different perceptual strategies as experts when compared to the control 
group. To summarize the findings from the inversion effect task, significant between-
group differences were detected in the GIE treatment effect for response time 
measures and in the FIE treatment effect for accuracy measures. For the control 
group, expertise training resulted in an enhanced GIE (as evidenced by a speed 
advantage for upright Greebles) and an enhanced FIE (as evidenced by an accuracy 
advantage for upright faces). On the other hand, neither the GIE nor the FIE were 
observed in the ASD group either before or after training. However, individuals with 
ASD did show significantly enhanced performance with upright and inverted 
Greebles following training (as evidenced by faster RT).  
More broadly, the results of the inversion effect task suggest that the control 
group processed objects of expertise through specialized holistic processing strategies 
and unfamiliar objects through local processing strategies. In contrast to the ASD 
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group, the control group’s strategy for objects of expertise could be clearly 
differentiated from their strategy for unfamiliar Greebles, as a face inversion effect 
was observed both before and after training and a Greeble inversion effect was 
observed after training only. The development of a Greeble inversion effect indicates 
that controls acquired the ability to employ holistic processing mechanisms after 
achieving expertise, supporting previous studies of perceptual expertise in control 
populations (Gauthier et al., 1998; Moore, Cohen, & Ranganath, 2007; Rossion et al., 
2002). The enhanced face inversion effect in the control group following training 
further suggests that controls were practicing holistic processing strategies during the 
training program. Because expertise training involves extensive practice of perceptual 
strategies used in expertise processing, the process that is practiced is likely to 
become more efficient as a result of training, resulting in enhanced holistic processing 
of Greebles and faces in the post-training inversion effect task. Surprisingly, the 
control group did not show the expected improved performance with upright Greebles 
as a result of training. Yet, although neither response time nor percent correct was 
significantly different after training versus before training, a trend towards 
improvement with upright Greebles after training was found, as controls were 68.65 
ms faster after training and 5.97% more accurate after training (see Table 3 and Table 
4). The lack of a significant improvement with upright Greebles may be attributable to 
the change in task from the training program to the inversion effect task or to the 
introduction of a new set of Greeble stimuli in the inversion effect task.  
Yet, despite statistically equivalent performance throughout training, 
individuals with ASD clearly employed different perceptual strategies after achieving 
expertise. These different strategies were evident in the lack of a Greeble inversion 
effect in the ASD group. However, because the ASD group achieved expertise within 
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the same time period as the control group, this different perceptual style cannot be 
associated with a decrement in performance. Rather, these results should be 
interpreted as further evidence that individuals with ASD often use a different 
perceptual or cognitive style to accomplish tasks (Happé, 1999).  
This different perceptual style may confer distinct advantages and 
disadvantages in expertise processing. The first striking aspect of this cognitive style 
is that individuals with ASD approach faces and objects of expertise with the same 
perceptual strategy as entirely novel objects (Greebles). Accordingly, individuals with 
ASD not only failed to show an inversion effect for unfamiliar Greeble stimuli, but 
also showed no evidence of an inversion effect with Greebles even after achieving 
expertise. In other words, individuals with ASD did not acquire perceptual 
specialization for the upright form of an object even after extensive training. Instead, 
they employ the same basic perceptual strategy regardless of experience with an 
object. This strategy likely involves a focus on the local parts of an object, as the 
perception of parts is not affected by orientation. Further supporting this assertion, 
individuals with ASD showed significantly faster response times for both upright and 
inverted Greebles following training, even though the training program involved 
exclusively upright Greebles. These results suggests that individuals with ASD likely 
acquired a local processing strategy during training, as the strategy they employed 
was equally effective for upright Greebles as for inverted Greebles.  
The use of a different perceptual strategy in ASD may reflect a different set of 
goals in how individuals with ASD approach the perception of objects of expertise. 
For typically developing individuals, expertise perception is often used to accomplish 
goals of a social nature. In particular, the same processes which underlie the inversion 
effect have been found to be important in facial identity recognition (McKelvie, 
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1995), emotional expression discrimination (Durand, Gallay, Seiqneuric, Robichon, & 
Baudoin, 2007; Fallshore & Bartholow, 2003), visual speech perception (Rosenblum, 
Yakel, & Green, 2003), and eye gaze processing (Jenkins & Langton, 2003). 
Consequently, it may be most adaptive for typical adults to approach all tasks of 
expertise perception with a holistic processing strategy. For individuals with ASD, on 
the other hand, the immediate detection of social cues from a face may not be the 
most important goal in object recognition. Instead, they may have developed a bias to 
focus on the local details of an object with the goal of understanding an object’s 
physical nature and how it functions as part of a system. Because following eye gaze 
and responding to emotional expression are integral parts of social interaction, 
inconsistent use of holistic processing may underlie some of the social difficulties in 
ASD.  
However, it is important to note, that although no significant inversion effects 
for faces or Greebles were detected in the ASD group, there were trends towards 
significant inversion effects for both sets of stimuli (see Figures 4 and 5). Yet, 
because individuals with ASD also showed a Greeble inversion effect that approached 
significance before expertise training, this trend in the ASD group does not reflect a 
perceptual specialization for the upright form of a stimulus as a result of extensive 
experience. Rather, this trend may simply reflect a greater sensitivity to the physical 
properties of a stimulus. This tendency could be attributable to a superior 
understanding of physical causality or ‘folk physics’ in individuals with ASD (Baron-
Cohen, 1997). Because of this sensitivity individuals with ASD may be more aware 
that the rounded top half of a Greeble (and a face) could not serve as a stable base. 
Accordingly, individuals with ASD may find physically impossible (inverted) stimuli 
more difficult to process regardless of experience with the object. This finding is 
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particularly relevant in light of recent studies that have reported an intact face 
inversion effect in ASD (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 
2007; Scherf et al., 2008; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003), as many of these studies did 
not compare the face inversion effect to an inversion effect with a novel non-face 
object.  
Interestingly, despite the different perceptual mechanisms employed by 
individuals with ASD, both groups achieved expert level processing with Greebles. In 
order to perform at levels comparable to typical individuals, it is likely that 
individuals with ASD are employing very efficient compensatory strategies, such as 
enhanced local processing. Yet, it is important to note that, even with such highly 
effective compensatory strategies, a preference for local processing over holistic 
processing may cause individuals with ASD to miss many of the subtle cues of 
identity and emotion that are embedded in the configuration of a face.  
A more general aim of the current study was to address possible hypotheses 
regarding the nature of the face processing deficit in ASD by examining the extent to 
which face processing deficits are face-specific or attributable to a more general 
cognitive/perceptual deficit. To address these hypotheses, it will be important to 
distinguish face processing ability from face processing strategy. First, because 
individuals with ASD were found to successfully acquire Greeble expertise in the 
current study and previous research has shown that individuals with ASD are 
impaired in face recognition (Blair et al., 2002; Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Davies et al., 
1994), this distinction suggests that the deficit found in the ability to discriminate and 
recognize faces may be face-specific to some extent. Yet, because individuals with 
ASD employ a different processing strategy with objects of expertise and faces, this 
finding suggests that differences in face processing strategy may reflect a more 
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pervasive cognitive or perceptual atypicality. In sum, our findings suggest that face-
specific explanations may be appropriate for understanding impairments in face 
processing abilities in ASD, while domain-general hypotheses may account for 
atypical face processing strategy. However, it is also possible that atypical face 
processing in ASD may require a more complex explanation than the one outlined 
above. Investigation into the development of perceptual expertise in infants and young 
children is clearly needed before these explanations can be confirmed. 
Although the current study is one of the first experimental studies of 
perceptual expertise in ASD, one clear limitation of this study is the small sample 
size. Another potential limitation of this study is the use of laboratory-trained objects 
of expertise, as it is unclear the extent to which expertise with Greebles relates to real-
life expertise. Although these two types of expertise have been equated theoretically, 
they are different on many levels, including the participants’ intrinsic motivation to 
acquire expertise and their total of history of experience with the object. Because 
individuals with ASD may have different motivational and attentional biases in 
achieving expertise, laboratory-trained expertise was chosen for the current study in 
order to control for these potential group differences.  
The study of perceptual expertise has broader implications for the 
development of novel face processing interventions for individuals with ASD. 
Because Greeble expertise can be achieved in less than ten hours, the development of 
expertise with Greebles provides a feasible model for the development of face 
expertise. Evidence from the current study suggests that a training program involving 
subordinate level processing may have some success for individuals with ASD. 
However, because holistic processing strategies do not develop naturally in 
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individuals with ASD, it may be that more explicit instruction is required in order to 
encourage the development of compensatory strategies.   
In summary, the current study suggests that, with sufficient motivation, 
individuals with ASD may show significant gains through expertise training 
programs. However, these gains may be limited by general perceptual biases that 
cannot be remediated even with an extensive amount of experience. Future face 
processing interventions for individuals with ASD should focus on both giving 
individuals with ASD more experience with faces and on enhancing compensatory 
strategies to overcome perceptual biases, which may be detrimental to the 
development of face processing abilities and more general social functioning.  
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Appendix A 
Greeble Training Procedure 
 
Tasks 
1) Family Inspect: Participants see a Greeble image above a family name 
(Camar, Nalli, Masio, Vomsi, or Yuju), with at least two examples from every 
family given each time the task is run. Greebles are presented one at a time 
(except in the first trial of the first session where ten Greebles are presented at 
once). The image and the label remain onscreen for 3 seconds with no 
response needed from participants. All 20 Greebles are included in this task 
(including Greebles who have not yet been assigned an individual name).  
a. Text shown before the task begins: 
“Please study the Greebles with their family names. You do not need 
to make any response.” 
2) Family Categorization: Participants see Greeble without label and must 
respond by pressing the first letter of the family name (C, N, M, V, or Y). If 
they respond incorrectly, they hear a ‘beep’. At least six examples of each 
family are presented whenever this task is run Greeble remains onscreen until 
participants press a button. This task includes all 20 Greebles in all sessions.  
a. “Please name the Greeble’s family by pressing the key for the first 
letter of the family name (example: press ‘C’ if the Greeble belongs to 
the family Camar)” 
3) Individual Inspect: A Greeble with an individual name (e.g., pimo) underneath 
it comes onscreen and remains onscreen for 3 seconds. Participants do not 
need to make a response. Five new Greebles are introduced in this task in each 
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of the first four sessions. This task only includes the new Greebles introduced 
in that particular session. The order in which the Greebles are introduced is 
random for each participant. 
a.  “You will now be introduced to five new Greebles. Please study them 
carefully and remember which Greeble belongs with which name. You 
will be tested on this later in training.” 
4) Naming with Response: Participants see a Greeble with an individual name 
beneath it and then press a key for the first letter of that name. The purpose of 
this task is to practice associating a particular key with a particular Greeble 
name. Participants hear a ‘beep’ if their response is incorrect. The Greeble 
remains onscreen until the participant has pressed the correct button. This task 
only includes new Greebles introduced in that session for sessions 1 to 4, but 
includes all 20 Greebles in sessions 5 to 10. 
a. “Next you will see a Greeble with an individual name underneath it. 
Please study the Greeble with the name and then press the key of the 
first letter of the Greeble’s name (example: press ‘W’ if you see a 
Greeble named Wobbi)” 
5) Naming with Feedback: A Greeble without a label comes onscreen and 
participants must press the key for the first letter of the Greeble’s name. The 
Greeble remains onscreen until the participant presses a key. If they respond 
incorrectly, they hear a ‘beep’ and see the Greeble again with correct name. 
The Greeble with the correct name remains onscreen for one second. This task 
only includes new Greebles introduced in that session for sessions 1 to 4, but 
includes all 20 Greebles in sessions 5 to 10. 
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a. “You will see a Greeble without a name and you should name the 
Greeble as quickly as you can, by pressing the first key of the 
Greeble’s name (example: press ‘S’ as quickly as you can when you 
see the Greeble ‘Snodi’). If you are incorrect, it’s okay since we will 
then show you the correct answer.” 
6) Naming Test: Participants first see the word ‘Name?’ or ‘Family?’ for one 
second and then see Greeble without label and must press the key for 
Greeble’s family or individual name.  In this task, all twenty Greebles are 
presented, including named and unnamed Greebles. If it is an unfamiliar 
Greeble, the correct response is to press space bar. The Greeble remains 
present until the participant attempts to name the Greeble. No feedback is 
provided for this task. Each task consists of 60 trials. 
a. “In this task, you will have to give the Greeble family name or 
individual name. You will first be told if it is the individual name 
(‘Name?’) or the family name (‘Family?’). You will then see a Greeble 
and then you will have to press the key of the first letter of that 
Greeble’s family or individual name. We will not be timing you for 
this test, so please take as long as you need to get the answer right. If 
the Greeble that you see is unfamiliar to you (if you believe that you 
have not learned the name of this Greeble yet), please press the 
SPACE BAR. This will be a test of your expertise so please try and do 
your best. You will be given as much time as you want to answer, so 
take your time and try to get the name correct. You will not be told if 
you are right or wrong after you respond.”   
  45 
7) Verification test:  Participants see either a family name or an individual name 
for 1000 ms, then a blank screen for 200 ms, followed by a Greeble. 
Participants must press the ‘c’ key if the label is correct or press the ‘i’ key if 
the label is incorrect. The Greeble remains onscreen until the participant 
presses a key and no feedback is provided for this task. This task will also 
include unnamed Greebles, with the correct pairing for an unnamed Greeble 
being the ‘NIL’ label. This test will include 120 trials in every block, so each 
Greeble will be tested 6 times for this task 
a.  “In this task, you will first see either a family name or an individual 
name. You will next see a Greeble. If the Greeble you see is matched 
with the right family or if the Greeble is matched with the right name, 
then press the key ‘C’ for ‘correct’. If the Greeble you see does not 
match the family name you see or if it is not matched with the right 
name, then press the key ‘I’ for ‘incorrect’. If it is a Greeble you have 
never seen before and it is paired with the word ‘NIL’, this answer is 
correct (‘c’). If an unknown Greeble is paired with any other name or if 
‘NIL’ is paired with a Greeble that already has an assigned name, this 
answer is incorrect (‘I’). Please keep your fingers on the ‘C’ and ‘I’ 
keys throughout this test. For this task you will be timed, so please 
answer as quickly and accurately as possible. This task will also test 
your expertise of Greebles, so please try your best. Remember we will 
be timing your response!”  
 
 
Session One  
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This should be displayed at the beginning of this session:  
 
“In these training sessions, you will learn the family and individual names of 20 
Greebles. You will have a few different exercises in each session to practice and you 
will be given instructions before the exercise begins. You will learn five new Greebles 
every session for the first four sessions. In the first half of this session, you will learn 
family names and then you will practice categorizing Greebles into their families. In 
the second half of this session, you will the Greebles’ individual names. At the very 
end of the session, you will be tested on this knowledge, so please study the Greebles 
and their names carefully. Remember if you are one of the top Greeble experts, you 
will receive a prize of £5!” 
 
1) Family Inspect- (10 Greebles at once, each with a family label underneath it, 2 
Greebles selected randomly from each family- one male and one female—
male means the parts are pointing up and female means the parts are pointing 
down)- 1 trial 
2) Family Inspect- 10 trials (one Greeble per trial this time and every other time) 
3) Family Categorization- 30 trials  
4) Individual Inspect- 10 trials (*Five new greebles introduced*)  
5) Naming with Response- 10 trials (new Greebles) 
6) Naming with Feedback- 15 trials (all Greebles) 
7) Naming- 60 trials (all Greebles included for the rest of the session) 
8) Verification- 120 trials 
9) Family Categorization- 30 trials  
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10) Naming with Response- 10 trials  
11) Naming- 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
Total trials= 476 
 
 
Session Two  
At the beginning of sessions 2, 3, and 4 other session: 
“Welcome back to Greeble training! In this session, you will first practice the family 
and individual names you learned in the last session. You will then be introduced to 
five new Greebles. After practicing these new names, you will be tested on all of the 
Greebles you know so far. Please try your best to learn the Greeble names, because 
your performance at the end of the session will determine when you become a 
Greeble expert. Remember that the top Greeble experts will receive a cash reward!” 
 
1) Family Inspect- 10 trials 
2) Naming with Response- 10 trials (with Greebles from previous session) 
3) Verification- 120 trials (with old Greebles) 
4) Individual Inspect (five new Greebles with names introduced) 
5) Naming with Response- 10 trials (new Greebles) 
6) Naming with Feedback- 15 trials (all Greebles) 
7) Naming- 60 trials  (all Greebles included for the rest of the session) 
8) Verification- 120 trials 
9) Naming - 60 trials 
10) Verification - 120 trials 
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11) Naming - 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
Total trials= 736 
 
Session Three 
1) Family Inspect- 10 trials 
2) Naming with Response- 40 trials (old Greebles) 
3) Verification- 120 trials (old Greebles) 
4) Individual Inspect- 10 trials (5 new Greebles introduced) 
5) Naming with Response- 10 trials (new Greebles only) 
6) Naming with Feedback- 45 trials (all Greebles included) 
7) Naming- 60 trials (all Greebles included for the rest of the session)  
8) Verification- 120 trials 
9) Naming - 60 trials 
10) Verification- 120 trials  
11) Naming - 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 771 
 
 
Session Four 
1) Family Inspect- 6 trials 
2) Naming with Response- 60 trials (only old Greebles) 
3) Verification- 120 trials 
4) Individual Inspect- 10 trials (only new Greebles) 
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5) Naming with Response- 10 trials (only new Greebles) 
6) Naming with Feedback- 60 trials (all Greebles included for the rest of the 
session) 
7) Naming- 60 trials 
8) Verification- 120 trials 
9) Naming - 60 trials 
10) Verification- 120 trials  
11) Naming - 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 806 
 
Session Five 
At the beginning of sessions 5,6,7,8, and 9: 
“Welcome back to Greeble training! You have now been introduced to all 20 
Greebles and you are well on your way to becoming an expert! Keep up the good 
work and you could win a cash prize for being one of the top Greeble experts!”  
 
(All twenty Greebles will be included for the rest of the training) 
1) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
2) Naming- 60 trials 
3) Verification- 120 trials 
4) Naming - 60 trials 
5) Verification - 120 trials 
6) Naming - 60 trials 
7) Verification- 120 trials 
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8) Naming - 60 trials 
9) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
Session Six 
1) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
2) Naming- 60 trials 
3) Verification- 120 trials 
4) Naming - 60 trials 
5) Verification - 120 trials 
6) Naming - 60 trials 
7) Verification- 120 trials 
8) Naming - 60 trials 
9) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
Session Seven 
10) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
11) Naming- 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
13) Naming - 60 trials 
14) Verification - 120 trials 
15) Naming - 60 trials 
16) Verification- 120 trials 
17) Naming - 60 trials 
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18) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
Session Eight 
10) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
11) Naming- 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
13) Naming - 60 trials 
14) Verification - 120 trials 
15) Naming - 60 trials 
16) Verification- 120 trials 
17) Naming - 60 trials 
18) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
Session Nine 
1) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
2) Naming- 60 trials 
3) Verification- 120 trials 
4) Naming - 60 trials 
5) Verification - 120 trials 
6) Naming - 60 trials 
7) Verification- 120 trials 
8) Naming - 60 trials 
9) Verification- 120 trials 
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Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
At the end of every session except session ten:  
 
“You have now completed this Greeble training session! Thank you for your help and 
keep up the good work!” 
 
Session Ten 
10) Naming with Response- 40 trials  
11) Naming- 60 trials 
12) Verification- 120 trials 
13) Naming - 60 trials 
14) Verification - 120 trials 
15) Naming - 60 trials 
16) Verification- 120 trials 
17) Naming - 60 trials 
18) Verification- 120 trials 
Total Trials = 760 trials  
 
At the end of session ten:  
 
“You have now completed Greeble training. Thank you so very much for all of your 
time and effort! Please call or email the researcher immediately so you can schedule 
your second session.” 
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